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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of designing physical watermark signals in order to optimally detect possible replay attack
in a linear time-invariant system, under the assumption that the system parameters are unknown and need to be identified online.
We first provide a replay attack model, where an adversary replays the previous sensor data in order to fool the system. A physical
watermarking scheme, which leverages a random control input as a watermark to detect the replay attack, is then introduced. The
optimal watermark signal design problem is cast as an optimization problem, which aims to achieve the optimal trade-off between
control performance and intrusion detection. An online watermarking design and system identification algorithm is provided to deal
with systems with unknown parameters. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal one and characterize the
almost sure convergence rate. A numerical example and an industrial process example are provided to illustrate the effectiveness
of the proposed strategy.
Index Terms
Cyber-Physical System, Security, Intrusion Detection, System Identification
I. INTRODUCTION
C
YBER-Physical Systems (CPSs) offer close integration of computational elements and physical processes [1]. They are
defined as systems where “physical and software components are deeply intertwined, each operating on different spatial
and temporal scales, exhibiting multiple and distinct behavioral modalities, and interacting with each other in a myriad of ways
that change with context” [2]. Such systems play a critical role in large varieties of fields, such as manufacturing, health care,
environment control, transportation, etc. Due to their wide applications and critical functions, it is of paramount importance to
ensure the secure operation of CPS [3], [4]. Any successful attack on CPS may jeopardize critical infrastructure and people’s
lives and properties, even threaten national security. In 2010, Stuxnet malware launched a devastating attack on Iranian uranium
enrichment facilities [5], [6]. This incident raised a great deal of attention to CPS security in recent years [7].
However, CPS security faces a wide variety of challenges. Cardenas et al. [8] discussed three main challenges and identified
unique properties of CPS security compared to traditional IT security. Besides, the physical part of CPS poses new security
challenges. Similar discussion can be found in [9]. Gollmann and Krotofil [10] pointed out that also people performing security
analysis of CPS is a key challenge. The authors argued that it is difficult for people to expertise in both cyber and physical
safety and able to appreciate limitations in their own domain.
Literature Review
A significant amount of research effort has been devoted to intrusion and anomaly detection algorithms to enhance CPS
security. Zimmer et al. [11] presented three mechanisms for time-based intrusion detection. The techniques, through bounds
checking, were developed in a self-checking manner by the application and through the operating system scheduler. Mitchell
and Chen [12] proposed a hierarchical performance model and techniques for intrusion detection in CPS. They classified the
modern CPS intrusion detection system techniques into two classes: detection technique and audit material. They summarized
advantages and disadvantages in [13]. Kwon et al. [14] discussed necessary and sufficient conditions for when the attacker
could be successful without being detected. Their method can be employed to evaluate vulnerability degree of certain CPSs.
Corresponding detection and defense methodologies against stealthy deception attacks can be developed. In [15], the authors
proposed a mathematical framework for CPS and investigated limitations of the monitoring system. Centralized and distributed
attack detection and identification monitors were also discussed.
In this paper, we consider the detection problem of replay attacks. In [16], [17], [18], a replay attack model is defined and
its effect on a steady-state control system is analyzed. An algebraic condition is provided on the detectability of the replay
attack. For those systems that cannot detect replay attack efficiently, a physical watermarking scheme is proposed to enable the
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2detection of a replay attack. In particular, by injecting a random control signal, the watermark signal, into the control system,
it is possible to secure the system. However, the watermark signal may deteriorate the control performance, and therefore it is
important to find the optimal trade-off between the control performance and the detection efficiency, which can be cast as an
optimization problem. Similar watermarking schemes are also proposed in the literature [19], [20], [21].
Different from the previous additive watermarking schemes, a multiplicative sensor watermarking scheme is proposed in [22].
In this scheme, each output is respectively fed to a SISO watermark generator and due to the inclusion of a watermark removing
functionality, the control performance will not be sacrificed. Applying some techniques of non-cooperative stochastic games,
Miao et al. [23] designed a suboptimal switching control policy that balances control performance and the intrusion detection
rate for replay attacks. Hoehn and Zhang [24] provided a novel technique via exciting the system in non-regular time intervals
and signal processing to detect the replay attack. Other replay attack detection mechanisms have also been proposed in the
literature [25].
It is worth noticing that in majority of the aforementioned research, the precise knowledge of the system parameters is
required in order to design the watermark signal and the detector. However, acquiring these parameters may be troublesome
and costly. Moreover, for a large system, the system parameters may change during its operation. Hence, it is beneficial for the
system to learn the parameters in an online fashion and automatically generate the optimal detector and the watermark signal
in real-time. The problem of learning parameters of dynamical systems, system identification, has been studied over the past
decades. Most methods, however, require persistent excitation on the input.
In this paper, due to the nature of the optimal watermark signal, we shall design the input that asymptotically converges
to a signal that does not satisfy the persistent excitation condition. However, by controlling the convergence rate, we can still
prove that the system parameters converge to true parameters almost surely.
Some preliminaries results regarding online design of physical watermarks are contained in our former work [26]. The main
differences between the current version of the paper and [26] are: 1) we not only prove that we can asymptotically identify
the system parameters, but also characterize the rate of the convergence; 2) we provide a procedure to automatically generate
the Neyman-Pearson detector; 3) we add the simulation on an industrial process to verify the effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
Contributions
The goal of this paper is to develop a data-driven approach to design physical watermark signals to protect systems with
unknown parameters, against replay attack. The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
1) An online “learning” algorithm is presented to simultaneously infer the parameters of the system based only on the system
input and output data and generate the watermark signal as well as the optimal detector based on the estimated parameters.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to study the detection of replay attacks under the scenario with unknown
system parameters.
2) We prove that the system parameters which are inferred via our proposed online algorithm converge to the true parameters
almost surely even if the input signal asymptotically converges to a degenerate signal.
3) We also characterize the almost sure convergence rate of the estimated system parameters to the true parameters and
provide an upper bound for this rate.
Outline of the Paper
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the problem by introducing the system as well as the
attack model. The physical watermarking scheme is introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we present an online algorithm to
simultaneously infer the parameters of the system and design the watermark signal as well as the detector based on the estimated
parameters. We further prove the almost sure convergence of the watermark signal to the optimal one and characterize the
convergence rate. In Section V, a numerical example and an industrial process example are provided to verify the effectiveness
of the proposed technique. Concluding remarks are given in Section VI. For the sake of legibility, most of the proofs are
included in the appendix.
Notations
‖A‖ of the matrix A is the spectral norm of an m×n matrix A, which is its largest singular value. A⊗B is the Kronecker
product of matrices A and B. A > 0 (A ≥ 0) indicates that A is positive definite (positive semidefinite). A+ denotes the
pseudo-inverse of A. We say that f(k) ∼ O(g(k)) if there exists an M > 0, such that |f(k)| ≤M × g(k) for all k ∈ N0.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce a linear time invariant system model of CPS as well as a replay attack model, which will be
employed in the rest of this paper.
3We consider a linear time-invariant system described by the following equation:
xk = Axk−1 +Bφk + wk, (1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector at time k, and wk ∈ Rn is a zero mean independently and identically distributed (i.i.d)
Gaussian process noise with covariance Q ≥ 0. φk ∈ Rp is the watermark signal that will be discussed in details in Section III.
A sensor network is monitoring the above system. The observation equation is given by
yk = Cxk + vk, (2)
where yk ∈ Rm is a collection of all sensors’ measurements at time k. vk ∈ Rm is a zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian measurement
noise with covariance R ≥ 0.
Remark 1. To simplify notations, in this paper we consider a stable open-loop system. However, our framework can be easily
extended to a closed loop system with an unstable plant but a stabilizing controller, which is discussed in Section III.
Notice that the purpose of the watermark signal is intrusion detection instead of stabilization. As a result, we only consider
stable systems or systems that have been pre-stabilized by some controller.
We assume that the process noise w0, w1, · · · and the measurement noise v0, v1, · · · are independent of each other. Further-
more, since CPSs usually operate for an extended period of time, it is assumed that the system is already in the steady state,
which means that the initial condition x−1 is a zero mean Gaussian random vector independent of the process noise and the
measurement noise and with covariance Σ, where Σ satisfies the following Lyapunov equation:
Σ = AΣAT +Q. (3)
We further make the following assumptions regarding the system parameters:
Assumption 1. The system is strictly stable. Furthermore, (A,C) is observable and (A,B) is controllable.
Remark 2. The observability and controllability assumption is without loss of generality as we can perform a Kalman
decomposition [27] and only work with the observable and controllable subspace.
Next we introduce a replay attack model. We assume that the adversary has the following capabilities:
1) The attacker has access to all the real-time sensory data. In other words, it knows the sensor’s measurement y0, · · · , yk
at time k.
2) The attacker can modify the real sensor signals yk to arbitrary sensor signals y
′
k.
Given these capabilities, the adversary can employ the following replay attack strategy:
1) The attacker records a sequence of sensor measurements yks from time k1 to k1+T , where T is large enough to guarantee
that the attacker can replay the sequence for an extended period of time during the attack.
2) The attacker modifies the sensor measurements yk to the recorded signals from time k2 to k2 + T , i.e.,
y′k = yk−∆k, ∀ k2 ≤ k ≤ (k2 + T ),
where ∆k = k2 − k1.
Notice that since the system is already in the steady state, both the replayed signal y′k and the real signal yk from the
sensors will share exactly the same statistics. As a result, replay attack can be stealthy for a large class of linear systems, if
no watermark signal is present, i.e. φk = 0. For more detailed discussion on the detectability of replay attack, please refer
to [16].
Let us consider the system illustrated in Fig. 1.
Uk φk Plant Sensor yk
wk vk
Detector
Online Learning
xk
Fig. 1. The system diagram.
The overarching goal of this paper is to design an online learning algorithm for the optimal replay attack detector as well
as the optimal parameters Uk of the physical watermark signals, based on the collected input φk and output yk. The physical
watermark scheme is introduced in detail in Section III. Based on this scheme, we develop an approach to infer the system
parameters based only on the system input data φk and output data yk, and design the highlighted parameters in Fig. 1: the
covariance Uk of the watermark signal φk and the optimal detector based on the estimated parameters.
4III. PHYSICAL WATERMARK FOR SYSTEMS WITH KNOWN PARAMETERS
This section introduces the concept of physical watermark, which enables the detection of replay attack. The optimal
physical watermark is derived via solving an optimization problem which aims to achieve the optimal trade-off between
control performance and intrusion detection. Then we will present the extension to a closed-loop system.
A. Physical Watermark Scheme
The main idea of physical watermark is to inject a random noise φk, which is called the watermark signal, into the system
(1) to excite the system and check whether the system responds to the watermark signal in accordance to the dynamical model
of the system. In this section we will restrict the watermark signal φk to be zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian random variables and
its covariance is denoted as U .
In the absence of the attack, yk can be represented as:
yk =
k∑
t=0
CAtBφk−t +
k∑
t=0
CAtwk−t + vk + CA
k+1x−1. (4)
For simplicity, let us define
ϕk ,
k∑
τ=0
Hτφk−τ , ϑk ,
k∑
t=0
CAtwk−t + vk + CA
k+1x−1, (5)
where Hτ is defined as
Hτ , CA
τB. (6)
Therefore, yk can be simplified as:
yk = ϕk + ϑk. (7)
It is easy to show that ϕk is a zero mean Gaussian whose covariance converges to U , where
U ,
∞∑
τ=0
HτUH
T
τ . (8)
Similarly, ϑk is a zero mean Gaussian noise whose covariance is W = CΣC
T +R, where Σ is defined in (3).
On the other hand, let us consider the system under the replay attack, where the replayed y′k can be written as
y′k = yk−∆k = ϕk−∆k + ϑk−∆k,
Now since ∆k is unknown to the system operator, we shall treat ϕk−∆k as a zero mean Gaussian random variable with
covariance U . As a result, y′k is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with covariance U +W . Therefore, to detect replay
attack, we need a detector to differentiate the distribution of yk under the following two hypotheses:
H0: The sensor measurement yk follows a Gaussian distribution N0(ϕk,W).
H1: The sensor measurement yk follows a Gaussian distribution N1(0,U +W).
Remark 3. It is worth noticing that the watermark signal φ0, · · · , φk are known to the system operator and detector and the
conditional distribution (conditioned on {φk}k) of yk converges to a Gaussian distribution with mean ϕk and covarianceW .
The Neyman-Pearson detector [28] for hypothesis H0 versus hypothesis H1 takes the following form:
Lemma 1. At time k, the Neyman-Pearson detector rejects H0 in favor of H1 if
gk =
(
yk − ϕk
)T
W−1
(
yk − ϕk
)
− yTk (W + U)
−1
yk ≥ η, (9)
where η is a threshold chosen by the system operator. Otherwise, hypothesis H0 is accepted.
Remark 4. For simplicity, we only consider detecting replay attack based on the current measurement yk. In principle, one
may take a moving horizon approach to design a detector, by considering joint distribution of yk, yk−1, · · · , yk−∆t. However,
the proposed methodology in this paper can be easily extended to multiple yks case by stacking the state vector.
Remark 5. It is worth noticing that since hypothesis H0 is time-varying due to the ϕk term, the threshold η needs to be
time-varying to ensure a constant false alarm rate. If η is still chosen as a constant instead, then the system operator could
calculate the expected false alarm rate by numerical integration, since ϕk is a stationary process.
The following theorem quantifies the performance of the detector, in terms of the expected KL-divergence between distribution
N0 and N1:
5Theorem 1. The expected KL divergence of distribution N0 and N1 is
E DKL (N1‖N0) = tr
(
UW−1
)
−
1
2
log det
(
I + UW−1
)
. (10)
Furthermore, the expected KL divergence satisfies the inequality
1
2
tr
(
UW−1
)
≤ E DKL (N1‖N0)
≤ tr
(
UW−1
)
−
1
2
log
[
1 + tr
(
UW−1
)]
.
(11)
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof in [17].
Remark 6. It is worth noticing that the expected KL-divergence is a convex function of U and hence U . However, both the
upper and lower bounds of it are increasing functions of tr(UW−1). Hence, instead of directly maximizing the detection
performance, which is computationally difficult, we could maximize tr(UW−1), which is linear with respect to U .
Note that although the watermark signal can enable the detection of replay attack, it also deteriorates the system control
performance. As a result, it is important to design the signal to achieve the optimal trade-off between the control performance
loss and the detection performance. In this paper, to quantify the performance loss, we use the following Linear Quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) metric:
J = lim
T→+∞
E
(
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
[
yk
φk
]T
X
[
yk
φk
])
, (12)
where
X =
[
Xyy Xyφ
Xφy Xφφ
]
> 0
is the weight matrix for the LQG control, which is chosen by the system operator.
Remark 7. The LQG cost is a common choice to quantify the performance of a system running in steady state. On the other
hand, we do not foresee any fundamental difficulty to incorporate other performance metrics into our framework, as long as
they can be computed from the Markov parameters Hτ .
Since yk and φk converge to a stationary process, J can be written in an analytical form as
J = lim
k→
tr
(
X Cov
([
yk
φk
]))
= tr
(
X
[
W + U H0U
UHT0 U
])
.
Therefore, J is an affine function of U , which can be written as
J = J0 +∆J = tr(XyyW) + tr(XS),
where J0 is the optimal LQG cost, and S is linear with respect to U , being defined as
S ,
[
U H0U
UHT0 U
]
.
Therefore, in order the achieve the optimal trade-off between the control performance and detection performance, we can
formulate the following optimization problem:
U∗ =arg max
U≥0
tr(UW−1)
subject to tr(XS) ≤ δ, (13)
where δ is a design parameter depending on how much control performance loss is tolerable.
An important property of the optimization problem (13) is that the optimal solution is usually a rank-1 matrix, which is
formalized by the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The optimization problem (13) is equivalent to
U∗ =arg max
U≥0
tr(UP)
subject to tr(UX ) ≤ δ, (14)
6where
P ,
∞∑
τ=0
HTτ W
−1Hτ , (15)
X ,
(
∞∑
τ=0
HTτ XyyHτ
)
+HT0 Xyφ +XφyH0 +Xφφ. (16)
The optimal solution to (14) is
U∗ = zz
T ,
where z is the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix X−1P and zTX z = δ. Furthermore, the
solution is unique if X−1P has only one maximum eigenvalue.
Proof. From the definition of U , we know that
tr(UW−1) =
∞∑
τ=0
tr
(
HτUH
T
τ W
−1
)
=
∞∑
τ=0
tr
(
UHTτ W
−1Hτ
)
= tr (UP) .
Following similar steps as in the above proof, we have that tr(XS) = tr(UX ). Moreover, since X > 0, we have that
X ≥ HT0 XyyH0 +H
T
0 Xyφ +XφyH0 +Xφφ
≥ Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ > 0.
If the optimal U∗ has rank greater than 1, then follow the same line of argument in the proof of Theorem 7 in [18], U∗ can
be decomposed as U = α1U1 + · · ·αlUl, where the following holds
1) αi > 0,
∑l
i=1 αi = 1.
2) Ui ≥ 0 is of rank 1 and tr(UiX ) = δ for all i.
Therefore, by the optimality of U∗, we can conclude that
tr(UP) ≤ min
i=1,...,l
tr(UiP).
However, since U∗ is a convex combination of U1, . . . , Ul, we must have
tr(U∗P) = tr(U1P) = · · · = tr(UlP),
which shows that the rank one matrix Ui is also optimal.
In order to derive the optimal rank one U∗, it is clear that U∗ = zz
T for some z 6= 0. Hence, the optimization problem (14)
is converted to
z =arg max
z 6=0
zTPz
subject to zTX z ≤ δ.
Using the Lagrangian multipliers, one can prove that Pz = λX z, which shows that z is the eigenvector of X−1P . If we
enumerate all eigenvectors of X−1P , it is not difficult to prove that the maximum is achieved when z is the eigenvector
corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of X−1P and zTX z = δ.
B. Extension to Closed-loop Systems
Before continuing on to the next section, we would like to discuss how to generalize the problem formulation for a closed-loop
system with a stabilizing controller. Consider the following system discussed in [16]:
xk+1 = Axk +B(uk + φk) + wk, yk = Cxk + vk,
with the following estimator and controller:
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +K(yk+1 − CAxˆk), uk = Lxˆk,
and LQG cost as
J = lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T−1∑
k=0
yTkXyyyk + (uk + φk)
TXφφ(uk + φk)
]
,
7where uk denotes the optimal LQG control signal.
We can redefine the state x˜k and output y˜k as
x˜k =
[
xk
xˆk
]
, and y˜k =
[
yk
uk
]
,
and the design of watermark signal in a closed-loop system can be converted to the open-loop formulation.
It is worth noticing that in order to design the detector and the optimal watermark signal, precise knowledge of the system
parameters is needed. However, acquiring the parameters may be troublesome and costly. Furthermore, there may be unforeseen
changes in the model of the system, such as topological changes in power systems. As a result, the identified system model
may change during the system operation. Therefore, it is beneficial for the system to “learn” the parameters and design the
detector and watermark signal in real-time, which will be our focus in the next section.
IV. PHYSICAL WATERMARK FOR SYSTEMS WITH UNKNOWN PARAMETERS
This section is devoted to developing an online “learning” procedure to infer the system parameters, based on which, we
show how to design watermark signals and the optimal detector and prove that the physical watermark and the detector
asymptotically converge to the optimal ones.
Throughout the section, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2. 1) A is diagonalizable.
2) The maximum eigenvalue of X−1P is unique.
3) The system is not under attack during the learning phase.
4) The number of distinct eigenvalues of A, which is denoted as n˜, is known.
5) The LQG weight matrix X and the largest tolerable LQG loss δ are known.
Remark 8. The first and second assumptions are required in order to ensure that the optimal covariance of the watermark
signal is a differentiable function of Hτ , i.e., the problem is not ill-conditioned. The third assumption is necessary since there is
no way to do system identification without (real) sensory data and it is also needed to prove the asymptotic convergence of our
algorithm to the true optimal solution as this cannot be achieved in finite time due to the inherent process and measurement
noise. Nevertheless, we shall illustrate through simulation, that after a certain period of learning phase, our algorithm can
approximate the optimal solution with reasonably well accuracy and the system can detect replay attack. The fourth assumption
is also required to prove convergence, although we shall demonstrate in the simulation that we can use a reduced model to
approximate the system with good accuracy. The fifth assumption should hold for all practical cases as X and δ are design
parameters chosen by the system operator.
For the sake of legibility, we shall introduce our algorithm first and present the theorem on the correctness of our approach
in the end.
A. An Online Algorithm
In this subsection, we will present the complete algorithm in a pseudo-code form. After that, the online “learning” scheme
will be introduced in detail.
Algorithm 1 describes our proposed online watermarking algorithm. The notations are described later in the subsection.
First, we initialize some parameters which will be used later. In each round of the while iteration, the optimal covariance of
the watermarking Uk,∗ based on current knowledge is computed firstly. Based on the derived covariance, one can update the
covariance Uk by combining “exploration” and “exploitation” term which will be described in detail later. According to the
updated covariance, we generate the watermarking signals φk and inject them to the plant. Then we collect the sensory data
yk and employ them and watermarking signals to infer necessary system parameters Hk,τ ,Pk,Xk. Based on the estimated
parameters, one can update the Neyman-Pearson detector gˆk. Then one can repeat the above process to identify system
parameters and design the watermarking signals as well as the optimal detector.
A pseudo-code form for Algorithm 1 is as follows:
Remark 9. For Algorithm 1, Pk,Xk are defined in (18), U is the covariance of watermarking signal, and Hk,τ is defined
in (20). Step 3 is the update of the covariance of the physical watermark in (17). All parameters will be illustrated in the
following subsections.
Then we will introduce this algorithm in detail.
8Algorithm 1 Online Watermarking Design
Initialization: P−1 ← I, X−1 ← Xφφ, k ← 0
Iteration:
1: while true do
2: Uk,∗ ← arg maxU≥0, tr(UXk−1)≤δ tr(UPk−1)
3: Uk ← Uk,∗ + (k + 1)−βδI
4: Generate random variable ζk ∼ N (0, I)
5: Apply watermark signal φk ← U
1/2
k ζk
6: Collect sensory data yk
7: Hk,τ ←
1
k−τ+1
∑k
t=τ ytφ
T
t−τU
−1
t−τ
8: Compute the coefficient of pk(x) by solving (23)
9: if pk(x) is Schur stable then
10: Update Pk,Xk from (24)-(29)
11: end if
12: Update gˆk from (30)
13: k ← k + 1
14: end while
Generation of the Watermark Signal φk
Let us design Uk, which can be considered as an approximation for the optimal covariance of the watermark signal U , as
Uk = Uk,∗ +
δ
(k + 1)β
I, (17)
where 0 < β < 1, δ is the maximum tolerable LQG loss defined in (13), and Uk,∗ is the solution of the following optimization
problem
Uk,∗ =arg max
U≥0
tr(UPk−1),
subject to tr(UXk−1) ≤ δ, (18)
and Pk−1 and Xk−1 are the estimate of P and X matrices, respectively, based on y0, . . . , yk−1, φ0, . . . , φk−1, both of which
are initialized as:
P−1 = I, X−1 = Xφφ.
The inference procedure of Pk and Xk for k ≥ 0 will be provided in the further subsections.
Remark 10. Notice that the second term (k+1)−βI on the RHS of (17) is crucial for parameter identification. The reason is
that Uk,∗ is in general a rank 1 matrix (as is proved in Thereom 2) and hence it does not provide persistent excitation to the
system for us to identify the necessary parameters. Conceptually, the (k+1)−βI term can be interpreted as an “exploration”
term, as it provide necessary excitation to the system in order for us to infer the parameters. The Uk,∗ is the “exploitation”
term, as it is optimal under our current knowledge of the system parameters.
At each time k, the watermark signal is chosen to be
φk = U
1/2
k ζk, (19)
where ζks are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors with covariance I .
Inference on Hτ
The rest of this section is devoted to inferencing the system parameters from the collected sensory data y0, . . . , yk and
watermarks φ0, . . . , φk. We will first identify the Markov parameters Hτ of the system.
Let us define the following quantity Hk,τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 3n˜− 2, as
Hk,τ ,
1
k − τ + 1
k∑
t=τ
ytφ
T
t−τU
−1
t−τ
= Hk−1,τ +
1
k − τ + 1
(
ykφ
T
k−τU
−1
k−τ −Hk−1,τ
)
, (20)
where Hk,τ is an estimate of Hτ at time k.
9Remark 11. It is worth noticing that other methods, such as subspace identification, may be superior for classical system
identification tasks to the method we proposed. However, since the covariance of our watermark signal converges to a degenerate
matrix (of rank 1), it is non-trivial to analyze the convergence properties for more advanced system identification methods,
such as subspace identification, which we shall leave as a further research direction.
It is worth noticing that the calculation of the matrices U , W , P and X requires Hτ for all τ ≥ 0. Next we shall show that
in fact only finitely many Hτ s are needed to compute those matrices, which requires one intermediate result:
Lemma 2. Assuming the matrix A is diagonalizable with λ1, . . . , λn˜ being its distinct eigenvalues, then there exist unique
Ω1, · · · ,Ωn˜, such that
Hτ =
n˜∑
i=1
λτi Ωi. (21)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that A is a diagonal matrix. As a result,
Aτ = diag(λτ1I1, λ
τ
2I2, · · · , λ
τ
n˜In˜),
where λi denotes the ith distinct eigenvalue of A, λ
τ
i denotes λi to the power of τ , and Ii is the identity matrix of size ni by
ni with ni the multiplicity of λi. Hence, we have
Hτ = CA
τB =
n˜∑
i=1
λτi Ωi,
with Ωi = C diag(0, . . . , 0, Ii, 0, . . . , 0)B, which completes the proof.
Since A satisfies its own minimal polynomial p(x) =
∏n˜
i=1(x − λi) = x
n˜ + αn˜−1x
n˜−1 + . . .+ α0, we know that for any
i ≥ 0:
Hi+n˜ + αn˜−1Hi+n˜−1 + · · ·+ α0Hi = CA
ip(A)B = 0. (22)
Leveraging (22), we could use H0, H1, · · · , H3n˜−2 to estimate both λis and Ωis and thus Hτ for any τ . To this end, let us
define: 

αk,0
...
αk,n˜−1

 , −Ξ−1k


tr(HTk,0Hk,n˜)
...
tr(HTk,n˜−1Hk,n˜)

 , (23)
where
Ξk ,


tr(HTk,0Hk,0) · · · tr(H
T
k,0Hk,n˜−1)
...
. . .
...
tr(HTk,n˜−1Hk,0) · · · tr(H
T
k,n˜−1Hk,n˜−1)

 ,
and
Hk,i ,


Hk,i
Hk,i+1
...
Hk,i+2n˜−2

 .
Remark 12. One can prove that αk,i from (23) is the solution of the following minimization problem:
min ‖Hk,n˜ + αn˜−1Hk,n˜−1 + · · ·+ α0Hk,0‖F ,
where ‖ · ‖F denotes the Frobenius norm of a matrix.
Let us denote the roots of the polynomial pk(x) = x
n˜+αk,n˜−1x
n˜−1+· · ·+αk,0 to be λk,1, · · · , λk,n˜. Define a Vandermonde
like matrix Vk to be
Vk ,


1 1 · · · 1
λk,1 λk,2 · · · λk,n˜
...
...
. . .
...
λ3n˜−2k,1 λ
3n˜−2
k,2 · · · λ
3n˜−2
k,n˜

 ,
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where λk,i is an estimate of λi at time k and λ
τ
k,i is λk,i to the power of τ , and we shall estimate Ωi as

Ωk,1
...
Ωk,n˜

 = (Vk ⊗ Im)+

 Hk,0· · ·
Hk,3n˜−2

 . (24)
Inference on ϕk, ϑk and W
This subsection is devoted to the inference of ϕk and ϑk defined in (5), which corresponds to the parts of yk generated by
the watermark signal and noise respectively. We will further infer the covariance W of ϑk.
Let us define
ϕˆk ,
n˜∑
i=1
ϕˆk,i, (25)
with ϕˆk,i = λk,iϕˆk−1,i +Ωk,iφk, and ϕˆ−1,i = 0. As a result, we can estimate ϑk as
ϑˆk , yk − ϕˆk. (26)
The covariance of ϑk can be estimated as
Wk ,
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
ϑˆtϑˆ
T
t . (27)
Inference on P , X , U and gk
Finally we can derive an estimation of the P and X matrices, which are required to compute the optimal covariance U of
the watermark signal, given by
Pk =
∞∑
τ=0
(
n˜∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)T
W−1k
(
n˜∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)
=
∞∑
τ=0

 n˜∑
i=1
n˜∑
j=1
λτk,iλ
τ
k,jΩ
T
k,iW
−1
k Ωk,j


=
n˜∑
i=1
n˜∑
j=1
(
∞∑
τ=0
(λk,iλk,j)
τ
)
ΩTk,iW
−1
k Ωk,j
=
n˜∑
i=1
n˜∑
j=1
1
1− λk,iλk,j
ΩTk,iW
−1
k Ωk,j , (28)
where (28) is derived from the summation of geometric series, and
Xk =
∞∑
τ=0
(
n˜∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)T
Xyy
(
n˜∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)
+
n˜∑
i=1
ΩTk,iXyφ +Xφy
n˜∑
i=1
Ωk,i +Xφφ
=
n˜∑
i=1
n˜∑
j=1
1
1− λk,iλk,j
ΩTk,iXyyΩk,j +
n˜∑
i=1
ΩTk,iXyφ
+Xφy
n˜∑
i=1
Ωk,i +Xφφ. (29)
The Neyman-Pearson detection statistics gk can be approximated by
gˆk =(yk − ϕˆk)
T W−1k (yk − ϕˆk)− y
T
k (Wk + Uk)
−1
yk, (30)
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where
Uk =
∞∑
τ=0
(
n˜∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)
Uk,∗
(
n˜∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)T
=
n˜∑
i=1
n˜∑
j=1
1
1− λk,iλk,j
Ωk,iUk,∗Ω
T
k,j . (31)
Remark 13. For the proposed online algorithm, the system identification and watermark design are tightly coupled. As is
commented in Remark 10, the watermarking-based replay attack detection requires the injection of a rank-1 watermarking
signal (assuming it is performed optimally). On the other hand, persistency of excitation is required for system identification,
i.e., the injected signal needs to be full rank. As a result, we carefully design the covariance of the injected signal to be the
“optimal” rank-1 covariance matrix on the current knowledge of the system, plus a diminishing factor (k + 1)−βI , and we
further prove in this paper that this additional term, although vanishing asymptotically, provides us with enough information
to perfectly identify the necessary parameters of the system.
Remark 14. It is worth noticing that comparing to an approach with off-line system identification first and then watermarking
design later, our approach provides the following advantages:
1) Theoretically speaking, finite-time system identification cannot identify the system parameters precisely and hence the
watermarking scheme will not be optimal if the system identification process is stopped.
2) In practice, the control system could slowly change due to various reasons (e.g., components wear out), so we need to
adjust the parameters continuously.
3) Moreover, for many practical control systems, a model of the system is not available. It is often too expensive to stop the
system operation and to perform off-line system identification.
We would like to further point out that the classical system identification procedure can be easily integrated to our approach,
by providing better estimation of P and X in the initialization step in Algorithm 1. Hence, classical system identification
approach complements our algorithm very well.
B. Algorithm Properties
The following theorem establishes the convergence of Uk,∗ and gk, the proof of which is reported in the appendix for the
sake of legibility.
Theorem 3. Assuming that A is strictly stable and Assumption 2 holds. If 0 < β < 1, then for any ǫ > 0, the following limits
hold almost surely:
lim
k→∞
Uk,∗ − U∗
k−γ+ǫ
= 0, lim
k→∞
gˆk − gk
k−γ+ǫ
= 0, (32)
where γ = (1− β)/2 > 0. In particular, Uk,∗ and gˆk almost surely converge to U∗ and gk respectively.
From the definition of Uk = Uk,∗ + (k + 1)
−βδI , we immediately have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Assuming that A is strictly stable and Assumption 2 holds. If 0 < β < 1, then for any ǫ > 0, the following limit
holds almost surely:
lim
k→∞
Uk − U∗
k−min(γ,β)+ǫ
= 0. (33)
Remark 15. It is worth noticing that (32) implies that both Uk,∗ − U∗ and gˆk − gk are of the order O(k−γ+ǫ) as k goes
to infinity. Hence, the convergence rate γ is maximized when β → 0+, which corresponds to the case where the exploration
term (k+1)−βδI in Uk stays constant. However, although this will maximize the performance for the inference algorithm, the
covariance Uk of the watermark signal φk will not converge to the true optimal U∗. In order to achieve “fastest” convergence
rate of Uk, we need to choose the decay rate for the exploration term to be β = 1/3 = arg maxβ(γ, β).
We would also like to point out that Theorem 3 only provides an upper bound for the almost sure convergence rate and
we plan to investigate the exact convergence rate in our future work. It is also interesting to see if faster convergence can be
achieved by using more advanced system identification techniques.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, the performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated. We will apply the proposed online “learning”
approach to a numerical example and an industrial process, Tennessee Eastman Process (TEP).
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A. A Numerical Example
First we choose m = 3, n = 5, p = 2 and A, B, C are all randomly generated, with A being stable. It is assumed that X in
(12), the covariance matrices Q and R are all identity matrices with proper dimensions. We assume that δ in (14) is equal to
10% of optimal LQG cost J0. Fig. 2 shows relative error ‖Uk,∗−U∗‖F /‖U∗‖F of the estimated Uk,∗ v.s. time k for different
βs.
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
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100
k
‖U
k
∗
−
U
∗
‖ F
/
‖U
∗
‖ F
β = 0
β = 1/3
Fig. 2. Relative error of Uk,∗ for different β. The red solid line denotes the relative error of Uk,∗ when β = 0. The blue solid line is the relative error of
Uk,∗ when β = 1/3.
From Fig 2, one can see that the estimator error converges to 0 as time k goes to infinity and the convergence approximately
follows a power law. From Theorem 3, we know that Uk,∗ − U∗ ∼ O(k
−γ+ǫ), where γ = (1 − β)/2. However, from Fig 2,
it seems that the convergence speed of the error for different β is comparable. Notice that Theorem 3 only provides an upper
bound for the convergence rate. As a result, it would be interesting to quantify the exact impact of β on the convergence rate,
which we shall leave as a future research direction.
Now we consider the detection performance of our online watermark signal design, after an initial inference period, where
no attack is present. It is assumed that the attacker records the sensor readings from time 104 + 1 to 104 + 100 and replays
them to the system from time 104 + 101 to 104 + 200. Fig 3 shows the trajectory of the Neyman-Pearson statistic gk and
our estimate gˆk of gk for one simulation. Notice that gˆk can track gk with high accuracy. Furthermore, both gˆk and gk are
significantly larger when the system is under replay attack (after time 104 + 101). Hence one can conclude that even without
parameter knowledge, we can successfully estimate gk and detect the presence of the replay attack.
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Fig. 3. The detection statistics v.s. time. The black solid line with circle markers is the true Neyman-Pearson statistics gk, assuming full system knowledge.
The red dashed line with cross markers denotes our estimated gˆk.
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B. TEP Example
Tennessee Eastman Process (TEP) is a commonly used process control system proposed by Downs and Vogel in [29]. In
this simulation, we adopt a simplified version of TEP from [30], as follows:
x˙ = Ax+Bu,
y = Cx,
where A,B and C are constant matrices 1.
This system simulates a MIMO system of order n = 8 with p = 4 inputs and m = 10 outputs. We discretize the system
using the control system toolbox in MATLAB, by selecting a sample time of 0.6s. Again, we choose X in (12), the covariance
matrices Q and R to be identity matrices with proper dimensions. We assume that δ in (14) is equal to 5% of J0, and β = 1/3.
In this simulation, we assume that we do not know the dimension of the state space, which is 8, and instead we underestimate
it by assuming that A only has n˜ = 5 distinct eigenvalues.
Fig. 4 illustrates the relative error ‖Uk,∗ − U∗‖F /‖U∗‖F after running the system for roughly 1 week (106 × 0.6s ≈
0.992week). Fig 5 illustrates the NP statistics gk and the estimated NP statistics gˆk, assuming that the adversary collects the
measurement from 106+ 1 to 106 + 100 and replays them to the system from time 106 + 101 to 106+ 200. One can see that
although we underestimate the dimensions of the system, our algorithm can still achieve a high accuracy.
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Fig. 4. Relative error of Uk,∗.
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Fig. 5. The detection statistics v.s. time. The black solid line with circle markers is the true Neyman-Pearson statistics gk, assuming full system knowledge.
The red dashed line with cross markers denotes our estimated gˆk.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an algorithm that can simultaneously generate the watermarking signal and infer the system parameters is
proposed. We prove that our algorithm converges to the optimal one and characterize an upper bound for the almost surely
convergence rate. For future works, we would like to quantify the exact convergence rate, as well as exploring other system
identification methods and prove their convergence. It is of interest to study secure control in other cases, such as batach-
operating process. We are also interested in adversarial learning when the sensor data is compromised.
1For more details about this dynamic model, please refer to Appendix I in [30].
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The whole appendix is devoted to proving Theorem 3. We shall present several preliminary results first and then proceed
with the proof of Theorem 3.
Preliminary Results
To simplify notations, for a random variable (vector, or matrices) xk, we denote that xk ∼ C(α) if for all ǫ > 0, we have
that xk ∼ O(kα+ǫ), i.e.,
lim
k→∞
‖xk‖
kα+ǫ
a.s.
= 0.
Notice that xk ∼ O(kα) implies that xk ∼ C(α), but the reverse is not necessarily true2. The following lemma establishes
some basic properties of C(α) functions:
Lemma 3. Assuming that xk ∼ C(α) and yk ∼ C(β), with α ≥ β, then the following statements hold:
1) xk + yk ∼ C(α), xk × yk ∼ C(α + β), and (xk + ∆xk)(yk + ∆yk) − xkyk ∼ C(max{αβ′, α′β, α′β′}), suppose that
∆xk ∼ C(α′) and ∆yk ∼ C(β′).
2)
∑k
t=0 xt ∼ C(α+ 1).
3) Suppose f is differentiable at 0 and α < 0, then
f(xk)− f(0) ∼ C(α).
4) sk ∼ C(α), with
sk = ρsk−1 + xk, s−1 = 0,
where |ρ| < 1.
5) Assume that Xk is a matrix and Xk ∼ C(α). Let
Sk = ASk−1B +Xk, S−1 = 0,
where A,B are matrices of proper dimensions. Then Sk ∼ C(α) if BT ⊗A is strictly stable.
6) ζk ∼ C(0), where {ζk} is a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables, i.e., ζk ∼ N (µ¯, Z).
Proof. The first three statements can be trivially proved and hence we only focus on the last three statements.
4) Since xk ∼ C(α), it is easy to see that for any ǫ > 0,
sup
k
|xk|
kα+ǫ
= Ma(ǫ) <∞. a.s.
As a result,
|sk|
kα+2ǫ
≤
1
kǫ
k∑
i=1
∣∣ρi−1∣∣ ∣∣∣xk−i
kα+ǫ
∣∣∣ ≤ 1
kǫ
Ma(ǫ)
1− |ρ|
,
which almost surely converges to 0 as k goes to ∞. As a result, sk ∼ C(α).
5) For the last statement, notice that
vec(Sk) =
(
BT ⊗A
)
vec(Sk−1) + vec(Xk).
Therefore, the argument that Sk ∼ C(α) follows the same line of proof as the fourth statement.
6) We only need to prove for the case where ζk follows the standard normal distribution. The high dimensional case can
then be proved by checking each entry of ζk with proper scaling and shifting. For any ǫ, φ > 0, we have
P
(
|ζk|
kǫ
> φ
)
=
√
2
π
∫ ∞
φkǫ
exp(−x2/2)dx.
Suppose that k is large enough, such that φkǫ > 1, then we have∫ ∞
φkǫ
exp(−x2/2)dx ≤
∫ ∞
φkǫ
exp(−x2/2)× xdx
= exp(−φ2k2ǫ/2),
2To see a counterexample, log k ∼ C(0), but log k is not of the order O(k0).
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and
lim
k→∞
k2 exp(−φ2k2ǫ/2) = lim
x→∞
(
2x
φ2
)1/ǫ
exp(−x) = 0.
As a result, using direct comparison test for infinite series, we can prove that
∞∑
k=1
P
(
|ζk|
kǫ
> φ
)
<∞,
which further implies (by Borel-Cantelli Lemma), that
lim sup
k→∞
|ζk|
kǫ
≤ φ, a.s.
Since φ can be arbitrarily small, ζk/k
ǫ → 0 almost surely, which finishes the proof.
Let {Fk} be a filtration of sigma algebras and {Mk} be a matrix-valued stochastic process that is adapted to the filtration
{Fk}, we call {Mk} a (matrix-valued) matingale (with respect to the filtration {Fk}) if the following equality holds for all t:
E (Mk+1|Fk) = Mk.
For the rest of the paper, we shall assume that the filtration Fk is the σ-algebra generated by the random variables
{x−1, φ0, · · · , φk, w0, · · · , wk, v0, · · · , vk}. Now we have the following lemma to establish a strong law for matrix-valued
martingale:
Lemma 4. If Mk = Φ0 + Φ1 + · · ·+ Φk is a matrix-valued martingale such that
E ‖Φk‖
2 ∼ C(β),
where 0 ≤ β < 1, then Mk/k converges to 0 almost surely. Furthermore,
Mk
k
∼ C
(
β − 1
2
)
.
Proof. Let Φk,ij (Mk,ij) be the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix Φk (Mk). It is easy to prove that {Mk,ij} is a scalar martingale
(adapted the same filtration {Fk}) and since3
Φ2k,ij ≤ ‖Φk‖
2,
we have that EΦ2k,ij ∼ C(β). For simplicity, let us define κ = (β + 1)/2. One can easily verify that for any ǫ > 0 and large
enough i, the following inequalities hold:
i1−1
(
k−κ−ǫ
)2−2
= 1,
and
∞∑
k=i
(
k−κ−ǫ
)2
k−1 ≤
∫ ∞
i−1
x−2κ−2ǫ−1dx
=
1
2κ+ 2ǫ
(i− 1)−2κ−2ǫ ≤
1
κ
(
i−κ−ǫ
)2
.
The last inequality is true since ǫ > 0 and for large enough i, (i− 1)/i→ 1.
Finally, one can prove the following equality(
k−κ−ǫ
)2
EΦ2k,ij = k
−β−2ǫ−1
EΦ2k,ij
= k−1−ǫ
EΦ2k,ij
kβ+ǫ
∼ O(k−1−ǫ),
which implies that
∞∑
k=1
(
k−κ−ǫ
)2
EΦ2k,ij <∞.
3This is due the fact that ‖A‖ = sup‖u‖=‖v‖=1 |u
TAv| ≥ |eTi Aej |.
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As a result, by Lemma 1 in [31], we can deduce that
lim
k→∞
Mk,ij/k
kκ−1+ǫ
= lim
k→∞
k−κ−ǫMk,ij
a.s.
= 0. (34)
Notice that (34) is true for all entries of the matrix Mk. Therefore,Mk/k ∼ C(κ−1), with κ−1 = (β+1)/2−1 = (β−1)/2.
Since β < 1, Mk/k converges to 0 almost surely.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3, which requires several intermediate steps.
Boundedness of Uk
Lemma 5. Uk is upper and lower bounded by:
δ(k + 1)−βI ≤ Uk ≤ δ
((
Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ
)−1
+ I
)
. (35)
Proof. The first inequality is trivially true since Uk = Uk,∗ + δ(k + 1)
−βI . For the second inequality, notice that
Xk ≥
(
n˜∑
i=1
Ωk,i
)T
Xyy
(
n˜∑
i=1
Ωk,i
)
+
n˜∑
i=1
ΩTk,iXyφ
+Xφy
n˜∑
i=1
Ωk,i +Xφφ
≥ Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ.
As a result, tr(Uk,∗Xk) ≤ δ implies that
Uk,∗ ≤ δX
−1
k = δ
(
Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ
)−1
,
and
Uk ≤ Uk,∗ + δI = δ
((
Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ
)−1
+ I
)
.
Convergence of Hk,τ
Lemma 6. Hk,τ −Hτ ∼ C(−γ), with γ = (1− β)/2. In particular, Hk,τ converges to Hτ almost surely.
Proof. It is easy to see that yk and Uk+1 are measurable w.r.t. Fk. Furthermore, let k1, k2 ≥ 0 be two time indices, then it is
easy to prove that
E(φk1φ
T
k2+1|Fk2) =
{
Uk2+1 if k1 = k2 + 1
0 otherwise
,
E(wk1φ
T
k2+1|Fk2) = 0, E(vk1φ
T
k2+1|Fk2) = 0, (36)
which, combined with (4), implies that
E
(
yk+τφ
T
k U
−1
k |Fk−1
)
= Hτ . (37)
Next we shall compute the expectation of ‖yk+τφTk U
−1
k ‖
2. Notice that from (19), φk = U
1/2
k ζk , where ζk follows the
standard normal distribution. Hence,
‖yk+τφ
T
k U
−1
k ‖
2 = ‖yk+τφ
T
k U
−2
k φky
T
k+τ‖
≤ ‖yk+τ‖
2‖ζk‖
2‖U−1k ‖ ≤ δ(k + 1)
β‖yk+τ‖
2‖ζk‖
2.
The last inequality is true due to (35). As a result, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
E‖yk+τφ
T
kU
−1
k ‖
2 ≤ δ(k + 1)β
√
E‖yk+τ‖4
√
E‖ζk‖4.
Notice that ‖ζk‖ is χ-distributed with p degree of freedom, which implies that E‖ζk‖4 = p(p+ 2). On the other hand, one
can prove that supk E‖yk‖
4 is bounded since by (35), Uk is upper bounded. As a result, we prove that
E‖yk+τφ
T
kU
−1
k ‖
2 ∼ C(β),
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which further implies that
E‖yk+τφ
T
k U
−1
k −Hτ‖
2 ≤ E
(
‖yk+τφ
T
k U
−1
k ‖+ ‖Hτ‖
)2
≤ E
(
2‖yk+τφ
T
k U
−1
k ‖
2 + 2‖Hτ‖
2
)
∼ C(β). (38)
As a result, by (37), one can prove that the following stochastic process is a matrix-valued martingale
Sτ,i(k + 1) = Sτ,i(k) +
[
y(k+1)τ˜+iφkτ˜+i+1U
−1
kτ˜+i+1 −Hτ
]
(39)
for the filtration Fkτ˜+i, where τ˜ = τ + 1, and 0 ≤ i ≤ τ . Now by (38) and Lemma 4, we know that
Sτ,i(k)
k
∼ C(−γ).
From the definition of Sτ,i(k), one can see that for large enough k,
Hk,τ −Hτ =
τ∑
i=0
ki
k
×
Sτ,i(ki)
ki
. (40)
where ki = max{t ∈ N : tτ˜ + i ≤ k}. Notice that ki ≥ 0 and
∑
ki = k. Hence, the estimation error of Hk,τ −Hτ is a convex
combination of Sτ,is. As a result, for any ǫ > 0
‖Hk,τ −Hτ‖ ≤ max
0≤i≤τ
‖Sτ,i(ki)‖
ki
∼ O(k−γ+ǫi ), (41)
Notice that when k is large enough, k/ki → τ , which implies that Hk,τ −Hτ ∼ C(−γ). The a.s. convergence can be trivially
proved by the fact that γ > 0 is positive.
Convergence of λk,i and Ωk,i
Notice that due to the convergence of Hk,τ to Hτ , we have that Ξk converges to Ξ, where
Ξ ,


tr(HT0H0) · · · tr(H
T
0Hn˜−1)
...
. . .
...
tr(HTn˜−1H0) · · · tr(H
T
n˜−1Hn˜−1)

 ,
with
Hi ,


Hi
...
Hi+2n˜−2

 .
We shall first prove that Ξ is invertible. Suppose that there exists α˜ = [α˜0, . . . , α˜n˜−1]
T
, such that Ξα˜ = 0, then
0 = α˜TΞα˜ =
∥∥∥∥∥
n˜−1∑
i=0
Hiα˜i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
,
which further implies that CAip˜(A)B = 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n− 2, and p˜(x) = α˜n˜−1xn˜−1 + · · ·+ α˜0. Hence, we know that

C
...
CAn˜−1

 p˜(A) [B · · · An˜−1B] = 0.
By the fact that (A,B) is controllable and (A,C) is observable, p˜(A) must be 0. However, since p(x) is minimal polynomial
of A, p˜(x) must be constantly 0, which proves that α˜ = 0 and Ξ is invertible.
Let us denote αis as the coefficients of the minimal polynomial p(x) = x
n˜ + αn˜−1x
n˜−1 + · · · + α0 of A, i.e., the monic
polynomial with minimum degree. As a result, we have
Hi+n˜ + αn˜−1Hi+n˜−1 + · · ·+ α0Hi = CA
ip(A)B = 0. (42)
Hence, one can prove that, 

α0
...
αn˜−1

 = −Ξ−1


tr(HT0Hn˜)
...
tr(HTn˜−1Hn˜)

 , (43)
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which, combined with the fact that Hk,τ −Hτ ∼ C(−γ) and Lemma 3.3, proves that αk,i − αk ∼ C(−γ). Since all the roots
of the polynomial p(x) are distinct, we can prove (see [32]) that λk,is are differentiable functions of αk,is at a neighborhood
of αi, which further proves that λk,i − λi ∼ C(−γ).
Now let us define V to be
V ,


1 1 · · · 1
λ1 λ2 · · · λn˜
...
...
. . .
...
λ3n˜−21 λ
3n˜−2
2 · · · λ
3n˜−2
n

 .
Since p(x) is the minimal polynomial of A and A is diagonalizable, the roots λis of p(x) are distinct, which proves that V
is of full column rank, i.e., rank(V ) = n˜. Therefore,
rank(V ⊗ Im) = rank(V )× rank(Im) = n˜m,
which implies that V ⊗ Im is of full column rank.
Therefore, by Lemma 2, 

Ω1
...
Ωn˜

 = (V ⊗ Im)+

 H0· · ·
H3n˜−2

 . (44)
Hence, by Lemma 3.3, Ωk,i − Ωi ∼ C(−γ).
Convergence of ϕˆk, ϑˆk and Wk
First we need to prove that ϕˆk − ϕk ∼ C(−γ), which holds as long as ϕˆk,i − ϕk,i ∼ C(−γ) for all i, where
ϕk,i = λiϕk−1,i +Ωiφk, ϕ−1,i = 0.
Notice that the error between ϕˆk,i and ϕk,i satisfies the following recursive equation:
ϕk+1,i − ϕˆk+1,i = (λi − λk,i)ϕk,i + λk,i(ϕk,i − ϕˆk,i)
+ (Ωi − Ωk,i)φk.
For any ǫ > 0, we have
‖ϕk+1,i − ϕˆk+1,i‖
(k + 1)−γ+2ǫ
≤ |λk,i|
‖ϕk,i − ϕˆk,i‖
k−γ+2ǫ
+
|λi − λk,i|
k−γ+ǫ
‖ϕk,i‖
kǫ
+
‖Ωi − Ωk,i‖
k−γ+ǫ
‖φk‖
kǫ
.
Notice that φk = U
1/2
k ζk . Since ζk ∼ C(0) by Lemma 3.6, and Uk is upper bounded by Lemma 5, φk ∼ C(0). Thus,
ϕk,i ∼ C(0) by Lemma 3.4. Furthermore, since λk,i − λi ∼ C(−γ) and Ωk,i − Ωi ∼ C(−γ) , for any ǫ1 > 0, there exists K
(possibly random), such that for any k ≥ K , the following inequalities hold almost surely,
|λi − λk,i| ≤ ǫ1,
|λi − λk,i|
k−γ+ǫ
‖ϕk,i‖
kǫ
+
‖Ωi − Ωk,i‖
k−γ+ǫ
‖φk‖
kǫ
≤ ǫ1.
Therefore, for k ≥ K , we have
‖ϕk+1,i − ϕˆk+1,i‖
(k + 1)−γ+2ǫ
≤ (|ρ|+ ǫ1)×
‖ϕk,i − ϕˆk,i‖
k−γ+2ǫ
+ ǫ1. a.s.
Now since |ρ| < 1, we can choose ǫ1 small enough such that |ρ|+ ǫ1 < 1, therefore,
lim sup
k→∞
‖ϕk,i − ϕˆk,i‖
k−γ+2ǫ
≤
ǫ1
1− |ρ| − ǫ1
. a.s.
Hence, ‖ϕk,i − ϕˆk,i‖/k−γ+3ǫ
a.s.
→ 0, which proves that ϕk,i − ϕˆk,i ∼ C(−γ).
Lemma 7.
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
ϑtϑ
T
t −W ∼ C(−0.5), (45)
where ϑk ,
∑k
t=0 CA
twk−t + vk + CA
k+1x−1.
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Proof. Let us define function A : Rn×n → Rn×n, such that for any symmetric matrix X ∈ Sn×n,
A(X) = X +AXAT +A2XA2T + · · · ,
For non-symmetric X ∈ Rn×n, we define
A(X) = A
(
X +XT
2
)
.
One can prove that
A(X)−AkA(X)AkT =
k−1∑
i=0
Ai
X +XT
2
AiT .
To simplify notations, let us define w−1 = x−1. By mathematical induction,
∑k
t=0 ϑtϑ
T
t can be written as
k∑
t=0
ϑtϑ
T
t =Mk − CANkA
TCT , (46)
where
Mk =Mk−1 +Πk (47)
Nk = ANk−1A
T + 2A
((
k∑
t=−1
Ak−twt
)
wTk
)
−A(wkw
T
k ). (48)
with
Πk = vkv
T
k + vk
(
k∑
t=−1
CAk−twt
)T
+
(
k∑
t=−1
CAk−twt
)
vTk
+ 2CA
((
k∑
t=−1
Ak−twt
)
wTk
)
CT − CA
(
wkw
T
k
)
CT ,
and initial condition
N−1 = A
(
x−1x
T
−1
)
, M−1 = CAN−1A
TCT . (49)
One can then prove that
E(Πk|Fk−1) =W , E‖Πk −W‖
2 ∼ O(1).
Hence,Mk−kW is a martingale andMk/k−W ∼ C(−0.5) by Lemma 4. On the other hand, for Nk, since A⊗A is stable,
Nk ∼ C(0) by Lemma 3, which proves that
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
ϑtϑ
T
t −W ∼ C(−0.5).
Now we can rewrite Wk −W as
Wk −W =
(
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
ϑtϑ
T
t −W
)
−
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
(
ϑt(φˆt − φt)
T + (φˆt − φt)ϑ
T
t
)
+
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
(φˆt − φt)(φˆt − φt)
T ,
By Lemma 3, Wk −W ∼ C(max{−0.5,−γ,−2γ}) = C(−γ).
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Convergence of the Rest
By Lemma 3.3, one can prove that Pk −P , Xk −X are all of the class C(−γ), as they are differentiable functions of λk,i,
Ωk,i and Wk. Therefore, Uk,∗ − U∗ ∼ C(−γ) since Uk,∗ is a differentiable function of Pk and Xk at a neighborhood of P
and X (see [32]).
Hence, one can prove that Uk − U ∼ C(−γ), as Uk is a differentiable function of λk,i, Ωk,i and Uk,∗.
Finally we prove that gˆk − gk ∼ C(−γ) due to Lemma 3.1.
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